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BRIEF NOTE
Santosky v. Kramer: Clear and Convincing
Evidence in Actions to Terminate Parental
Rights
The Supreme Court of the United States has construed the
fourteenth amendment of the Constitution to afford parents the
right to raise and maintain custody of their children without unnecessary state interference.' Nevertheless, a parent's neglect or
abuse of a child may force a state not only to interfere with this
right, but also to seek a total and permanent severance of the parent-child relationship. In so doing, however, a state must act in
accordance with due process mandates.2 Recently, in Santosky v.
Kramer,' the Supreme Court considered whether the Constitution
requires a state to assume a specific burden of proof when it initiates an action to terminate parental rights. The Court held that
due process requires a state to prove "its allegations by at least
clear and convincing evidence."' Santosky illustrates the Court's
continuing struggle to ensure an individual's right to due process
while protecting the often conflicting requisites of federalism.
During 1973 and 1974, after incidents reflecting parental neglect, the Ulster County Department of Social Services obtained
separate court orders granting the Department temporary custody
of the Santoskys' three children.5 In 1978 the Department peti1. E.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977); Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52

(1972); Prince v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399(1923); aee also United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142 (1973) (Constitution safe-

guards the privacy of the home); Roe v..Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1972) (woman's decision to terminate pregnancy is within constitutionally protected zone of privacy); Griswold

v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (a statute which forbids the use of contraceptives violates the right to marital privacy).
2. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. See generally Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972) (due process protects liberty and
property interests).
3. 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982).

4. Id. at 1391.
5. Id. at 1393. After the Department obtained temporary custody of the Santoskys'
three oldest children, the Santoskys had two more children. The Department never initiated
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tioned the court to terminate the Santoskys' parental rights.6 At an
initial "fact-finding hearing,"'7 the Santoskys challenged the constitutionality of section 622 of the New York Family Court Act,
which required the Department to prove its allegations by only a
"fair preponderance of the evidence."' The family court judge rejected this challenge and applied the statutory standard. After
hearing the evidence, the judge ruled that the Santoskys were unfit
to raise their children.' In a subsequent "dispositional hearing,"
the judge permanently terminated their parental rights, holding
that this was necessary to protect the interests of the children. 10
The Santoskys appealed and again asserted that a standard of
proof requiring only a preponderance of the evidence violated the
mandates of due process. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, affirmed the termination and held that this standard was
constitutional since it established a balance between the parents'
and the child's rights in a termination proceeding."" The Supreme
Court of the United States vacated the Appellate Division's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court
held that in a termination proceeding, due process demands that a
state present at least clear and convincing evidence. The Court
stressed, however, that state law should determine the "precise
burden equal to or greater than that standard.""2
Santosky is not the first Supreme Court decision defining the
requirements of procedural due process in an action to terminate
parental rights. In 1981 the Court, in Lassiter v. Department of
Social Services,1' considered an indigent parent's right to courtappointed counsel in a termination proceeding. In a five-to-four
any action to obtain custody of the Santoskys' two younger children. Id. at 1393 n.5.
6. In 1976 the Department also had initiated an action to terminate the Santoskys'
parental rights, but it was unsuccessful in that action. Id. at 1393 n.4.
7. New York employs a two-step termination procedure. At the initial "fact-finding"
hearing, the state must prove parental fault or unfitness. If the state prevails in this hearing,
the court then holds a "dispositional hearing" in which the court must determine whether
terminating the parents' rights is in the child's best interest. Id. at 1391, 1398.
8. N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 622 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1981-1982).
9. The court concluded that the Santoskys had not maintained meaningful contact with
their children and were incapable of planning for their children's future. 102 S. Ct. at 1393.
10. See supra note 7.
11. In re John AA, 75 A.D.2d 910, 427 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1980). The New York Court of
Appeals subsequently denied review. 51 N.Y.2d 768, 432 N.Y.S.2d 1031 (1981).
12. 102 S. Ct. at 1403. The Court did not express any opinion as to the merits of the
case, stating: "Unlike the dissent, we carefully refrain from accepting as the 'facts of this
case' findings that are not part of the record and that have been found only to be more
likely true than not." Id. at 1403 n.19.
13. 452 U.S. 18 (1981). For a discussion of Lassiter, see 36 U. MIAMI L. REv. 337 (1982).
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decision, the Lassiter Court held that due process does not necessitate an absolute right to counsel, but instead requires courts to de-4
termine the need for appointing counsel on a case-by-case basis.'
Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented, arguing that an absolute right to counsel is essential to protect a parent's interest in maintaining child custody.'" Blackmun, Brennan,
and Marshall added that an absolute right to counsel is more consistent with principles of federalism, since case-by-case analysis
would require continual federal intervention and review of both
the adequacy of state procedures and the decisions of individual
state judges denying indigent parents the assistance of counsel."6
The four Justices who dissented in Lassiter and Justice Powell
comprised the Santosky majority, which adopted a uniform burden of proof, despite the protests of four dissenters who argued
that a case-by-case analysis was more appropriate. 7 Although
Lassiter and Santosky reached divergent results in that Santosky
required a strict burden of proof while Lassiter allowed a flexible
case-by-case analysis, the issues in the two cases were quite similar. Both focused on the mandates of due process in termination
proceedings, and only Justice Powell found a sufficient distinction
between these cases to enable him to join both majorities. By so
doing, he influenced the decision of an otherwise equally divided
Court. The Santosky majority opinion and the dissent reveal the
implications of this shift in the Court.
The Santosky majority, in an opinion authored by Justice
Blackmun, adopted several aspects of the Lassiter Court's analysis.1 s For example, the Lassiter Court unanimously agreed that
14. 452 U.S. at 32. Justice Stewart authored the majority opinion in which Chief Justice
Burger and Justices White, Powell, and Rehnquist joined.
15. Id. at 35. (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting); id. at 5960 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 50-52 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting). These
dissenters argued that a case-by-case approach could result in a constitutional challenge
every time a trial court denied counsel for an indigent parent.
17. The Santosky dissent observed that "not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure." 102 S. Ct. at 1405 (Rehnquist, J., joined by
Burger, C.J., and White and O'Connor, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408

U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). The dissenting Justices argued that due process analysis cannot be
achieved by considering only the effects of a specific burden of proof. Rather, a court must

consider all of the procedural safeguards that a state employs and measure their cumulative
effect. A court should also consider any nonprocedural restraints on official action. "Only
through such a broad inquiry may courts determine whether a challenged government action satisfies the due process requirement of 'fundamental fairness.'" 102 S. Ct. at 1405
(Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and White and O'Connor, JJ., dissenting).
18. 102 S. Ct. at 1393-94.
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state intervention to terminate a parent-child relationship must afford the parent procedural due process. e The Lassiter majority
and three dissenters" also believed that determining whether due
process mandates a specific procedural safeguard requires the balancing of three factors that the Court had previously established in
2" 1) the private interest that the proceeding
Mathews v. Eldridge:
affects; 2) the risk of error in the state's procedures, and the value
of additional or alternative safeguards; and 3) the government interest in maintaining the use of the challenged procedure.2
Despite these similarities, the Santosky majority asserted that
Lassiter was distinguishable. The Lassiter majority reasoned that
in determining whether due process requires the appointment of
counsel in termination proceedings, the "Eldridge factors" must be
weighed against a presumption that no right to counsel exists absent a "potential deprivation of physical liberty.

' 23

In contrast to

the right-to-counsel decisions, the Santosky majority stated that
the Court's previous decisions, which determined constitutionally
prescribed burdens of proof, had not relied on any presumptions
favoring one standard over another. Rather, the Court had engaged
in a straightforward weighing of the Eldridge factors to determine
24
the minimum standard of proof necessary to afford due process.
The purpose of a constitutional standard of proof is to "instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions
for a particular type of adjudication. 2 5 The minimum standard
that due process requires also reflects society's judgment concerning the importance of the competing interests and allows society to
allocate the risk of error accordingly between the litigants." By ad19. 452 U.S. at 37, 59.
20. In his dissent to the Lassiter decision, Justice Stevens argued that the right to
counsel in termination proceedings was too essential to depend on a balancing test. Nevertheless, he agreed with the other dissenters that the factors enunciated in Eldridge favored
requiring the appointment of counsel. Id. at 59-60. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
21. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
22. Id. at 335.
23. 452 U.S. at 31. Justice Blackmun did not believe that this presumption existed. Id.
at 40 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting). This distinction may
have been noted to induce Justice Powell to join the Santosky majority. See 102 S. Ct. at
1394.
24. 102 S. Ct. at 1394-95.
25. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). In Winship the
Court held that due process requires a state to prove a criminal defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, and applied the same standard to juvenile delinquency proceedings.
26. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (due process requires clear and convincing standard of proof in proceeding to commit an individual to a mental hospital); see
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justing the burden of proof, society can protect one party from an
erroneous judgment, but 7only at the expense of placing an increased risk on the other.2
Courts generally employ three standards of proof that form a
continuum indicating society's concern about the outcome of a
case. At one end of the spectrum is the "preponderance of the evidence" standard, which applies in most civil litigations involving
money damages. Although the individual litigants may be intensely
interested in the result, this standard reflects both society's minimal concern over the outcome and its conclusion that the litigants
should bear the risk of error almost equally."
At the other end of the spectrum is the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard. Society has "historically and without any explicit
constitutional requirement" afforded criminal defendants the protection of this burden of proof to ensure due process. 9 The strictness of this standard reflects society's desire to minimize the risk
that an erroneous judgment may deprive a criminal defendant of
life or liberty. By demanding this standard in criminal prosecutions, society has imposed "almost the entire risk of error upon
itself."' 0
When the interests at stake are "more substantial than mere
loss of money," courts employ an intermediate standard that includes "some combination of the words 'clear,' 'cogent,' 'unequivocal' and 'convincing.' "" In civil cases, therefore, courts often require a litigant to satisfy this standard when alleging fraud or
other "quasi-criminal wrongdoing."' "3The Supreme Court has held
that due process requires this burden of proof in proceedings that
may stigmatize an individual or deprive him of a significant liberty
interest."' The Court has adopted this standard in proceedings
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970).

27. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 370-71 (Harlan, J., concurring).
28. Santosky v. Kramer, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1395 (1982).
29. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. at 423. Before Winship, which involved the- imposition of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof to juvenile delinquency proceed-

ings, the Court had frequently assumed that the Constitution required this standard of
proof in criminal prosecutions. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958);

Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 138 (1954); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
174 (1949); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 253 (1910); see also Comisky, The Likely
Source: An Unexplored Weakness in the Net Worth Method of Proof, 36 U. MIAMi L. Rav.

1 (1981) (discussion of Holland and standard of proof in criminal tax evasion prosecutions).
30.
31.
32.
33.

Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. at 424.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 425-26.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:369

that threaten an individual with commitment to a mental hospital, 4 deportation," or denaturalization3 6
In determining the requisite burden of proof, the Santosky
majority first concluded that, despite a state's good faith belief in
the adequacy of its procedures, the establishment of minimum
standards for due process is a matter of federal law.37 The majority
argued that the Court must establish this minimum standard in
accordance with the risk of error that is usually inherent in a particular type of litigation: "Prospective case-by-case review cannot
preserve fundamental fairness when a class of proceedings is governed by a constitutionally defective evidentiary standard." 8
To determine the adequacy of New York's standard of proof,
the Santosky Court evaluated the three Eldridge factors: the private interest affected, the risk of error in New York's procedure,
and New York's interest in the procedure. Considering the first
factor, the majority reasoned that, in termination proceedings, the
parent has a "commanding" interest in a just decision.39 Because
termination proceedings may permanently and irrevocably sever a
parent-child relationship, these actions may lead to a "unique kind
of deprivation.

40

Moreover, a termination not only deprives par-

ents of a liberty interest, it also stigmatizes the parents by labeling
them unfit to raise their children.4 1 The Santosky majority, therefore, reasoned that the private interest weighed heavily against using a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof.
Examining the second Eldridge factor, the majority concluded
that termination hearings are likely to have a high risk of error.
These actions typically involve imprecise measures of parental
fitness that "leave determinations unusually open to the subjective
34. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
35. Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
36. Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960); Schneiderman v. United States, 320
U.S. 118 (1943).
37. 102 S.Ct. at 1395.
38. Id. at 1396 (footnote omitted).
39. Id. at 1397 (quoting Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)).
40. Id. The deprivation may be more severe than a temporary incarceration resulting
from a criminal prosecution. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 59-60
(1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Davis v. Page, 618 F.2d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'd in
part, 640 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1981) (rehearing en banc).
41. 102 S.Ct. at 1397. The majority stated that a showing of parental unfitness is probably a constitutional requirement in parental rights terminations. A state would almost certainly violate due process if it attempted to terminate a parent's rights solely to protect the
best interests of the child. Id. at 1397 n.10.
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Social and cultural bias also may affect a

termination decision because the parents are often poor, uneducated people, who typically are members of a minority group. 4s
The majority reasoned that a burden of proof requiring only a preponderance of the evidence may increase the risk of error by misdirecting the factfinder to consider the quantity rather than the
quality of evidence."
Finally, the majority reasoned that a higher standard of proof
would not adversely affect any state interest. 45 Although the state
has an interest in protecting the child's welfare, an erroneous termination of parental rights does not benefit the child: "[W]hile
there is still reason to believe that positive, nurturing parent-child
relationships exist, the parens patriaeinterest favors preservation,
not severance, of natural familial bonds."' "6 Furthermore, in con-

trast to requiring a hearing 47 or court-appointed counsel,48 a
stricter standard of proof would not impose any significant fiscal or
administrative burdens on the state.
From this analysis, the Santosky majority concluded that a
preponderance of the evidence standard of proof violated the requisites of due process: "'The individual should not be asked to
share equally with society the risk of error when the possible injury
to the individual is significantly greater than any possible harm to
the state.' Thus, at a parental rights termination proceeding, a
4
near-equal allocation of risk . . . is constitutionally intolerable." '
The majority considered whether proof beyond a reasonable doubt
was required as the minimum constitutional standard, but reasoned that the evidence in termination hearings was not susceptible to this level of certainty.50 Accordingly, the majority held that
42. Id. at 1399 (citing Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 835 n.36
(1977)).
43. Id. (citing Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 833-35 (1977)).
44. Id. at 1400. The state has numerous resources from which it can accumulate large
quantities of evidence. These resources may include the agency records concerning the family and experts in family relations, psychology, and medicine.
45. Id. at 1401.
46. Id.
47. Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347 (1976)). In Eldridge the Court

held that due process did not require the state to conduct a hearing before terminating the
disability benefits that an individual was receiving from Social Security.
48. Id.; see Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
49. 102 S.Ct. at 1402 (citation omitted) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427
(1979)).
50. Termination hearings often involve medical and psychiatric testimony that is not
susceptible to absolute proof. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979). Nor is it
usually possible to prove lack of parental affection, concern, or ability beyond a reasonable
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in these hearings, due process mandates the intermediate standard
of proof-clear and convincing evidence or its equivalent.5 1
Writing for the dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that the
Court's analysis and holding were inconsistent with principles of
federalism. He began his analysis by stating: "[Flew of us would
care to live in a society where every aspect of life was regulated by
a single source of law. . . .[Family relations have] been left to the
States from time immemorial, and not without good reason."" Allowing the states to experiment with various solutions to family
problems often has achieved new and effective results. The dissent
argued that the ability of the states to initiate different problemsolving approaches is "one of the happy incidents of the federal
system."" Accordingly, the dissent believed that the Court should
give substantial weight to a state's good faith judgment that its
procedures provide individuals with adequate protection."
Although imposing a higher standard of proof may appear to
be an unobtrusive measure for protecting private rights, the dissent argued that fixing a constitutional standard of proof will inevitably lead to further federal interference in state proceedings. The
Court will have to determine whether other individual components
of a state's procedural system satisfy due process." Justice Rehnquist suggested that the Court should determine whether a termination proceeding violates due process by considering the state's
entire procedural ststem and interfere only if its cumulative effect
presents a clear constitutional violation."
The dissent argued that New York had adopted a comprehendoubt. But see Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (Supp. III 1979) (requiring
proof beyond a reasonable doubt to terminate the rights of Indian parents).
51. Thirty-three states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands already required a higher standard of proof than the "fair preponderance of the evidence." 102 S. Ct.
at 1392.
52. Id. at 1403 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., White and O'Connor, JJ.,
dissenting).
53. Id. at 1404 (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
54. Id.
55. Id. Rehnquist proceeded to argue:
By holding that due process requires proof by clear and convincing evidence the
majority surely cannot mean that any state scheme passes constitutional muster
so long as it applies that standard of proof. A state law permitting termination
of parental rights upon a showing of neglect by clear and convincing evidence
certainly would not be acceptable to the majority if it provided no procedures
other than one thirty-minute hearing.
Id.
56. Id. at 1403.
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sive system to assist marginal parents in regaining custody of a
child. The state seeks to reunite broken families, and provides for
termination of parental rights only when restoration of the family
becomes impossible. Even then, the dissenters noted, New York
provides numerous procedural safeguards to ensure fundamental
fairness."7 The adoption of a standard of proof requiring a preponderance of the evidence reflected "New York's good faith effort to
balance the interests of parents against the legitimate interests of
the child and the State."5 8 The dissenters therefore concluded that
the Court should have deferred to the state's determination about
which standard best protected these interests.
In effect, the dissent believed that the requisites of due process should depend on a case-by-case, or at most a state-by-state,
review to determine whether the cumulative effect of an entire procedural system is fundamentally fair. 9 The Santosky majority,
however, would establish uniform standards defining minimum
constitutional requirements for a particular proceeding. Either approach arguably is consistent with due process and federalism, but
the Court has produced incongruous results by shifting from an
approach of flexibility to one of strict constraints.
Lassiter and Santosky, when considered together, produce a
surprising result. A state can now provide due process by demanding clear and convincing evidence in termination proceedings, even
if it does not appoint an attorney to represent an indigent parent."
But a state will violate due process, despite its appointment of an
attorney for the parent, if it requires only a preponderance of the
evidence as the standard of proof."' A higher standard of proof,
however, may be irrelevant to an indigent, uneducated parent who
lacks the ability, without the assistance of counsel, either to crossexamine the state's witnesses effectively or to present a meaningful
defense. 0
It is difficult to explain the incongruity between Lassiter and
57. Id. at 1406-10.
58. Id. at 1404. The majority rejected this argument, stating that in the factfinding
hearing, the parent and the child share an interest in maintaining the natural familial bonds
against an erroneous termination. 102 S. Ct. at 1398; see supra note 7.
59. See supra note 17.
60. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981). Ms. Lassiter had
the benefit of a standard of proof requiring "clear, cogent, and convincing evidence." N.C.
GEN. STAT.

§ 7A-289.30(e) (1981).

61. See Santosky v. Kramer, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982). New York appointed an attorney to
represent the Santoskys. See N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 262(a)(iii) (McKinney 1975).
62. 102 S. Ct. at 1399.
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Santosky. Both cases involved similar termination proceedings,
and both employed the Eldridge factors to assess the requirements
of due process. Nevertheless, Justice Powell favored Lassiter's
case-by-case analysis, but in Santosky he opted for a uniform constitutional standard. Since Justice Powell did not write an opinion
in either case, his reasoning remains unclear. The majority opinion
in Santosky suggests two considerations that might have influenced him: 1) there is a presumption against requiring the appointment of counsel in cases that do not threaten a litigant's physical
liberty; and 2) requiring appointed counsel imposes a fiscal burden
on the state. 3
The Santosky Court's ability to require a higher standard of
proof without imposing a burden on the state, however, probably
did not greatly influence Justice Powell, because, in denying an absolute right to counsel, the Lassiter majority indicated that the
cost of an attorney was not a significant consideration." Alternatively, after accepting the premise that due process does not demand that parents receive appointed counsel, Justice Powell could
have reasoned that a higher standard of proof was necessary to ensure fundamental fairness in termination proceedings.
Although the Santosky Court established a constitutional
minimum standard of proof, rather than adopting a case-by-case
review, the Court's struggle between these approaches is far from
resolved. In future decisions, the Court will continue to balance the
various interests in determining the safeguards necessary to ensure
due process. Minor distinctions between cases may influence the
result, and both private rights and federalism will remain hanging
on an unstable balance.
ROBERT

63. Id. at 1401.
64. 452 U.S. at 28.
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